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Ammeter, voltmeter and other diagnostics

 
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nuckolls.bob(at)aeroelect
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PostPosted: Sun Jun 06, 2010 7:53 am    Post subject: Ammeter, voltmeter and other diagnostics Reply with quote

Bob N has bucket loads of electrical knowledge and my hat is off to him for sharing with and educating ignorant people like myself. But, when it comes to operating an airplane, I differ with his opinion. I prefer to have more, not less, information in my cockpit.

What one does with that information is another story - and that is where Bob's concept comes into play. He indicates that pilots should not use information about their electrical system to make assessments or decisions while airborne.

No. Not DEPEND on information while airborne . . .

Bob advocates having an electrical plan B that removes the PIC from the airborne decision process.

No. The effective Plan-B MUST be crafted and understood by
that same PIC. The PIC is very much in the loop. The task
is to do all the investigation, deduction, design and
planning ON THE GROUND. The cockpit is a lousy classroom
for crisis management.

By the way, these are not ideas unique to me. They have
been handed down by generations of thoughtful
students/teachers of the art and science of elegant
systems design. What I've offered is not mere opinion
but fact demonstrated by our ancestors.

As you clearly explained, the intent is to make electrical problems idiot-proof. Nothing wrong with that as it can make aviation safer and simpler.

I think you have mis-interpreted my offerings.
"Idiot proof" was never a design goal.

When one crafts a complex system wherein the
smallest of failures represents a major operational
problem (like a speck of rust clogging your carburetor
jet) the prudent designer strives for failure tolerance.

I have produced an analysis of the accident that
totaled an expensive airplane, injured some folks
and now plagues the lives of individuals who would
MUCH rather be flying, water skiing, or reading
a good book. All this expense, inconvenience,
pain and taxation of $time$ came about because
some individuals didn't know what they didn't know.
They stacked extra goodies together with some
notion of adding "safety" while in fact, crafting
a system guaranteed to fail. Poor application of
a $3 worth of components set the stage for $millions$
of misery. This pilot had perhaps 30 seconds to do all
the multi-tasking that was demanded of him before
the inevitable came to pass.

Adequate and accurate information about system operation
and behavior in both normal and failure modes is necessary
for REDUCING probability of failure, REDUCING the effects
of any given failure and crafting a PLAN-B for comfortable
management of said failure.

But, the pilot in me wants information. For me, more information is better

Absolutely . . . but a desire for lots of lights and
dials in the cockpit and plans to sift offered
data in flight suggests a lack of confidence
in understanding the system.

The goal was never to make any part of the
system idiot proof . . . it was to gather together
EVERY simple-idea about system functionality. No
data point left unexplored. I.e., everything
to be known was known and ALL information was
considered . . . BEFORE THE AIRPLANE EVER LEAVES
THE GROUND.

It was my suggestion from the beginning that one
can craft a system with a very low parts count,
low cost of ownership and PRE-PLANNED steps for
failure contingencies. This is NOT a task for an
of, by or for the idiot. Artful implementation of
these design goals yields the simplest of systems
to operate thus reducing risks to the operator's
ability to multitask: to aviate, navigate, communicate,
diagnose, mitigate failure, and perhaps pray while
the wheels are off the ground.

Like my teachers before me, I encourage everyone to KNOW as
much about the aircraft's function as they are capable and
willing to acquire. I encourage everyone to understand
how ALL the simple-ideas combine to form a useful,
comfortable, inexpensive recipe for success.

Consider the notion of stacking of lots of dials and
gages on the panel with a plan for using them in flight to
become better educated about what's wrong and
what to do about it. Does this not suggest that the designer
doesn't know what he doesn't know but plans to learn
it later . . . literally "on the fly".

The system with a single LOW VOLTS warning light
was never a design goal for idiots . . . it was
but one component in a system crafted with a
design goal of failure tolerance and comfortable
operation by the most knowledgeable of builder/
operators. Indeed, the artfully crafted design
goes far beyond data displays.

It is best that lots of cockpit data be used for
operational enlightenment and/or in-flight
entertainment than for DISCOVERY OF NEW WAYS to
deal with an unfolding crisis.

An interesting study in failure modes effects
analysis:

Consider Figure Z-13/8. Search out and identify ANY
single failure where panel display of voltage or
current at any point in the system would be
useful to the pilot in terms of producing a
sure, simple response and graceful recovery.

If a heretofore unconsidered failure/data pair
is identified, what changes could be made to the
design to relieve the pilot of that DISTRACTION
should such a failure occur? We're not treating
pilots like potential idiots. We're doing all we
can BEFORE THE AIRPLANE IS BUILT to reduce risk
of diverting the pilot's time and attention from
the most critical tasks. MOST important, we're
combing the system design, materials and processes for
risk of failure from which no graceful recovery
is possible. This unfortunate condition is more
likely to arise from lack of attention to process
than from a lack of panel displays of real-time data.

The proportion of airplanes bent and people broken
rooted in electrical system failures is VERY small.
Of those cases, the outcomes would have been
strikingly different if failure tolerance were
improved, pilot workload were reduced, and/or
pilot understanding were enhanced. It's my
confident wager that the outcome of any such
incident would NOT have improved by putting
more numbers up on the panel.

Bob . . .
[quote][b]


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Speedy11(at)aol.com
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PostPosted: Mon Jun 07, 2010 8:47 pm    Post subject: Ammeter, voltmeter and other diagnostics Reply with quote

Bob,
I'll attempt to explain myself in the fewest words.
I meant no offense to you. Your concepts are excellent and your contribution to aviation and aviation safety is renowned. We all owe you - some of us in treasury and others for our lives.
1. I say, yes, DEPEND on electrical information while airborne. I do DEPEND on cockpit information while airborne - whether it is electrical information, or something else, such as airspeed indication. I analyze presented information (electrical or otherwise) to determine if the system is properly functioning. If my airspeed indication appears to be erroneous, I have several backup plans. If my electrical indications are non-normal, I have several backup plans. The backup plans are not crisis management in the cockpit nor are they devised "on the fly."
2. I concur that investigation, deduction, design and planning are best done on the ground. Crisis management should not be done in the cockpit. Management of a crisis is preplanned - detailed thought in advance is vital. Having a detailed plan of action for all of the situations you can expect allows you to adjust when an unplanned situation presents itself. That has happened to me several times - once when a never-happened-before malfunction occurred and forced me to eject. Ground preparation is critical to success in a non-normal situation and cockpit information is critical to assessing the situation and making the correct decision.
3. I can guarantee you that my desire for cockpit information is not due to "a lack of confidence in understanding the system." I, and I suspect all pilots, study our aircraft systems in detail and have a plan of attack in the event of systems failures. Implementation of your electrical concepts, say Z-11, should not preclude having electrical information in the cockpit. Furthermore, that information can help the pilot analyze the malfunction - which will lead to a better decision.
4. I'll bet a dollar that if the membership of this list were polled, the consensus perception would be as James described - that is, your electrical plan B is intended to make airborne decisions simpler - or put another way, more "idiot-proof." So, if I have misinterpreted your offerings, others likely have, too. You profess that fuses and/or circuit breakers should not be reachable by the pilot. You profess that pilots do not need electrical data in the cockpit for fear they may try to analyze that data instead of defaulting to plan B. Your concepts are well thought out, but the result (or perception) is that the pilot is removed from the decision process in the event of an electrical non-normal. Thus, the airplane is made more "idiot-proof."
I have the highest regard for the depth of your electrical knowledge. My decades of flying knowledge have proven to me that having information in the cockpit is important.
As you have stated, analysis is best done on the ground - I call that preparation. But, application must be done in the air. Information in the cockpit is important in any non-normal situation - even electrical.
Regards,
Stan Sutterfield
Quote:
He indicates that pilots should
not use information about their electrical system to make assessments
or decisions while airborne.

  No. Not DEPEND on information while airborne . . .

Bob advocates having an electrical plan B that removes the PIC from
the airborne decision process.

No. The effective Plan-B MUST be crafted and understood by
that same PIC. The PIC is very much in the loop. The task
is to do all the investigation, deduction, design and
planning ON THE GROUND. The cockpit is a lousy classroom
for crisis management.

By the way, these are not ideas unique to me. They have
been handed down by generations of thoughtful
students/teachers of the art and science of elegant
systems design. What I've offered is not mere opinion
but fact demonstrated by our ancestors.

As you clearly explained, the intent is to make electrical problems
idiot-proof. Nothing wrong with that as it can make aviation safer
and simpler.

I think you have mis-interpreted my offerings.
"Idiot proof" was never a design goal.

When one crafts a complex system wherein the
smallest of failures represents a major operational
problem (like a speck of rust clogging your carburetor
jet) the prudent designer strives for failure tolerance.

I have produced an analysis of the accident that
totaled an expensive airplane, injured some folks
and now plagues the lives of individuals who would
MUCH rather be flying, water skiing, or reading
a good book. All this expense, inconvenience,
pain and taxation of $time$ came about because
some individuals didn't know what they didn't know.
They stacked extra goodies together with some
notion of adding "safety" while in fact, crafting
  a system guaranteed to fail. Poor application of
a $3 worth of components set the stage for $millions$
of misery. This pilot had perhaps 30 seconds to do all
the multi-tasking that was demanded of him before
the inevitable came to pass.

Adequate and accurate information about system operation
and behavior in both normal and failure modes is necessary
for REDUCING probability of failure, REDUCING the effects
of any given failure and crafting a PLAN-B for comfortable
management of said failure.

But, the pilot in me wants information. For me, more information is better

Absolutely . . . but a desire for lots of lights and
dials in the cockpit and plans to sift offered
  data in flight suggests a lack of confidence
in understanding the system.



[quote][b]


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nuckolls.bob(at)aeroelect
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PostPosted: Tue Jun 08, 2010 8:35 am    Post subject: Ammeter, voltmeter and other diagnostics Reply with quote

One thing that does come across in your messages, and in Bob's, is
that thinking about things in advance is obviously the best thing.
Perhaps I need to take more of a Bob-centric approach to other systems
in the plane, e.g. what happens if I lose my xyz instrument? Or some
other system.

Exactly! . . . except that the processes I've been
recommending have nothing to do with any original
material or thought processes on my part. Failure Modes
Effects Analysis is an armchair exercise that brightly
illuminates . . .

(1) the evaluator's understanding of the system
design goals . . .

(2) the simple-ideas that went into fabrication . . .

(3) effectiveness of the design in meeting design
goals . . .

(4) the potential effects on outcome of a flight
by failure of any single part. See:

http://www.aeroelectric.com/articles/Failure%20Modes%20Effects%20Analysis.pdf

Every system aboard a type-certificated aircraft
gets this microscopic analysis during the
certification process. After a few FMEA
experiences, a designer tends to incorporate
the FMEA thought processes throughout the design,
development and testing processes.

The goal is to minimize complexity, weight, cost
of ownership, and hazards due to inevitable failures.
A huge benefit can be realized by designs so
elegant that the pilot can deal with ANY single
failure with an absolute minimum of distraction
-OR- hazard for having reacted to a failure event
based on an erroneous deduction.
Bob . . .


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PostPosted: Tue Jun 08, 2010 9:59 am    Post subject: Ammeter, voltmeter and other diagnostics Reply with quote

At 08:06 AM 6/8/2010, you wrote:
Quote:
I would be interested in the accident report for the situation Bob
describes, $3 or so of parts causing loss of life and so many $$ of damage.

There was no loss of life . . . only enduring injury.
This is a case in litigation where I'm a participant.
I'll publish a report on my findings when the case
is decided.
Bob . . .


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